Help Yemen, not its government طباعة
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الثلاثاء, 05 يناير 2010 09:34

Yemen needs aid, but propping up its ailing regime will only perpetuate its problems

Brian Whitaker

guardian.co.uk, Monday 4 January 2010 11.30 GMT

Concerned about the "regional and global threat" from terrorists in Yemen, Gordon Brown is to host an emergency summit in London later this month. Yemen, at the southern tip of the Arabian peninsula, is a country that tends to be off the radar except when something untoward happens affecting foreigners – when it gets a brief period of attention before it's forgotten again.

The current wave of attention results from the attempt to blow up flight 253 last month, the Fort Hood shootings in November and, to a lesser extent, the attempted assassination of the Saudi deputy interior minister last August – all of which had a Yemeni connection.

Though the fears these incidents arouse internationally are very real, they are not fears that Yemenis themselves necessarily share. Alongside the country's other problems, al-Qaida and like-minded types are little more than a persistent nuisance. In the meantime, there's a war in the north with the Shia Houthi rebels that has cost thousands of lives and, in the last few months, has made well over 100,000 homeless. There is also agitation and occasional violence by secessionists in the south, plus widespread disaffection with the government in other parts. The economy is in dire straits and corruption is rampant.

Looming on the horizon is drought and overpopulation. Yemen has the highest birth rate in the Middle East – at any given time 16% of Yemeni women are pregnant – along with a steady and growing influx of refugees from the Horn of Africa. It's also running out of water as wells are drilled deeper and deeper.

The country's al-Qaida connection is nothing new. It dates back more than 20 years to the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan when unemployed jihadis began flocking to Yemen. Both geographically and socially, there are resemblances between Afghanistan and Yemen: the Yemeni state is virtually non-existent outside the cities; it is an impoverished tribal society with a weapons culture and numerous unofficial militias. This, together with Yemen's long and notoriously porous land and sea borders, makes it relatively easy for al-Qaida types to operate without much interference.

Even before al-Qaida arrived, Yemen was a recognised safe haven for extremists. Members of the German Red Army Faction took refuge in the southern part of the country (then run by Marxists) in the late 1970s, as did Carlos the Jackal in the 1970s and 1980s.

In January last year, al-Qaida announced a merger between its Saudi and Yemeni sections. This basically meant it was regrouping and centring itself in Yemen – probably because of the campaign the Saudi authorities had been waging against it. In effect, the Saudis' success has exacerbated the situation in Yemen.

Yemen will remain fertile ground for al-Qaida and similar groups unless its wider problems can be sorted out by ending the current internal conflicts, developing the economy, controlling population growth, conserving water and, above all, establishing a stronger and more effective state.

Building a stronger state does not mean more authoritarian rule (Yemen has already had plenty of that) but less. The need is for a state that has people's support and confidence – one that is seen to serve the interests of the nation rather than a clique, one that can provide services efficiently and is capable of equitably enforcing the rule of law throughout the country, equitably.

The tricky question, of course, is how to achieve that and what role outsiders can – or should – play. It's tempting to rush in, saying "something must be done", without considering what the negative effects might be. The recent US-sponsored airstrikes against al-Qaida are a case in point. They appear to have missed several of the targeted individuals and killed dozens of innocent people, including women and children – which inevitably inflames anti-western sentiment. Yemen does need outside help in dealing with al-Qaida but the less visible it is, the better. The American right has other ideas, though, and would much prefer to see Obama go in with guns blazing.

Helping to protect the 2,000-km coastline from an influx or arms and infiltrators is a sensible idea, since Yemen has no navy of any significance. It can be done unobtrusively, and the Americans, Saudis and Omanis are reportedly already engaged in that. It will probably make a difference but it won't stop infiltration altogether.

Whatever else is done, it's important to distinguish between measures that benefit Yemen and those that benefit the regime of its president, Ali Abdullah Saleh. The worst of all outcomes would be to be perceived as propping up Saleh at a time when his power is clearly ebbing away. Saleh, who rose through the army, has ruled northern Yemen since 1978 and both parts of the country since unification of north and south in 1990. He is now in his last presidential term and has to step down by 2013, when he will be 71, unless he changes the constitution – a move that is not impossible but in the present circumstances would probably cause uproar.

Saleh may well claim that he is the only person who can save Yemen from the abyss (with international support, of course) but his bluff should be called on that. As Marc Lynch put it in a recent article for Foreign Policy, "The government of Ali Abdullah Saleh is to a great extent the problem, not the solution."

Saleh has had opportunities before for reconciliation with the Houthi rebels in the north and he could have headed off the secessionist movement in the south, but he squandered them. He has made symbolic gestures against corruption while allowing it to flourish. His security services seem more interested in pursuing critical journalists than religious fanatics. He has, to his credit, allowed a multi-party system and regular elections (well, fairly regular anyway) while ensuring that his own party is the only one to get a serious look-in.

Saleh's fate is a matter for Yemenis themselves to determine and foreign powers should not frustrate that process by prolonging his stay in power through ill-judged "assistance". It will only come back to haunt them when he's gone. Yemen certainly needs sustained, long-term help, and the most helpful way to start is by not helping Saleh.