20مليار دولار ثروة الرئيس في بنوك أوروبا

[صوت الجنوب]

20مليار دولار ثروة الرئيس في بنوك أوروبا


هذا هو المصدر اخي هارون


[فقط الأعضاء المسجلين والمفعلين يمكنهم رؤية الوصلات . إضغط هنا للتسجيل]

August 2004
Writing on the wall for Yemeni president

Sheikh Badreddin al-Houthi is an eminent scholar of the Zaidi Shiite denomination of Islam. Clerics and believers have long flocked to his home in the mountainous northern Yemeni district of Saada to discuss matters of faith and community affairs. But recently the Sheikh has been inundated with visitors for different reasons. They have been arriving in droves to express their outrage at the military offensive launched by President Ali Abdallah Saleh against the district, and specifically against his son Hussein and his acolytes. Hussein al-Houthi had followed in his father’s footsteps. Over the years he emerged as an influential religious ******, running a network of religious centres and preaching at mosques throughout the northern and central parts of the country. He was also elected to parliament in 1993 and served until 1997. His sermons typically ended with the congregation chanting anti-American and anti-Israeli slogans. Such scenes had gradually become commonplace, notably in the capital Sanaa, without provoking any backlash from the state. Hence the surprise at the president’s sudden change of attitude. This occurred after he returned from the US, where he was one of the Third World ******s invited to attend the G-8 summit. When he got back he faced a barrage of criticism for his behaviour at the summit and mockery over his decision to attend it clad in “traditional” attire. One of the first things he proceeded to do was threaten military action against Houthi and his supporters. It seemed an impetuous move, starkly at odds with the way things are normally done in Yemen.
For months, go-betweens had been interceding between the authorities and Houthi over the latter’s anti-Americanism, which hardly amounted to “incitement” as it reflected the sentiments of many Yemenis outraged at the’ US behaviour in Iraq. Palestine and elsewhere. The real issue appears to have been Houthi’s contention that Saleh is unfit to govern on religious grounds. His Zaidi doctrine, while in some respects closer to Sunni Islam than other strands of Shiism, shares aspects of the Shiite belief in an Imamate vested in descendants of the Prophet Muhammad –- a definition which could be applied to many leading Yemeni tribes but not Saleh’s Sanhan clan. Such a disqualification, even from a minority religious ******, is unhelpful to a president who seized power 26 years ago amid a succession of bloody power-struggles, runs a highly nepotistic regime, and makes little secret of his desire to bequeath his job to his son Col. Ahmad Saleh.

Saleh also seems to have persuaded the Americans that Hussein al-Houthi was part of a plot by the Iranians to spread their brand of Shiism and politics in Yemen, and that Tehran had been arming his followers. The Zaidi ****** is sympathetic to aspects of the Twelver Shiism prevalent in Iran, but ironically it was Saleh himself who first allowed the Islamic Republic to establish medical and cultural centres throughout Yemen and thus seek to spread its political creed. But he appears to have thought it useful to pose as a bastion against Iranian influence, just as he did earlier with regard to al-Qaida. While many Yemenis balked at what they saw as their president’s resort to sectarian incitement, they were equally aghast at his boast that a punitive military assault against Hussein al-Houthi would resolve everything. The campaign turned into fiasco, making a mockery of the state and a hero of the dissident cleric. The Zaidi ******, by no means a warlord, continues to date to hold out. Most of the hundreds of casualties have been on the government side, and the president eventually resorted to hiring and arming tribal irregulars to throw into the battle. One tribe that was recruited for the purpose lost its sheikh in the fighting. Saleh even persuaded a young son of the ****** of Yemen’s largest tribal confederation, Sheikh Abdallah al-Ahmar, to send some of his clansmen to join the campaign. Between 30 and 35 of them were killed. When his father found out, while undergoing medical treatment in Saudi Arabia, he was incandescent. He sent an emissary to rein the boy in pending his return. Many Yemeni tribal and religious ******s can be expected to follow the lead set by Ahmar, who is also speaker of the Yemeni parliament, and demand that the state engage the dissident Zaidi cleric in dialogue. Houthi’s followers had not, after all, initiated any violence, and he had not declared any rebellion. His dissent was verbal and his reasoning religious, and his views about the president were by no means unique.

Indeed, Saleh may have moved against him because he felt he was opening the floodgates to public denunciation of his regime and thus bringing its demise closer. Some regime insiders go further, suggesting that Houthi was brought to centre-stage as part of the fierce rivalry for power and influence between the president’s cousin Ali Muhsin, who commands the northwestern military sector, and his son Ahmad. Ali Muhsin was in charge of planning and carrying out the operation ordered by the president, which was conducted in a manner that risks dragging Yemen into sectarian and tribal conflict. As a reputed Zaidi convert to Wahhabism, Ali Muhsin is considered hostile to all forms of Shiism. They note that he was also the commander who failed spectacularly a few years ago to prevent Eritrea’s seizure of the Hanish islands off the Red Sea coast, amid allegations that he was bribed by the Saudis to facilitate the move in a bid to humiliate Saleh. With Ahmad being groomed for the succession by his father, Ali Muhsin may have seen Houthi’s “rebellion” as a suitable vehicle for his ambitions. Hussein al-Houthi may or may not survive, but his message has certainly been amplified by the campaign against him. It rings true to many Yemenis, and echoes their multiple grievances against the regime. The writing may be on the wall for a president who has held power for a quarter of a century through a combination of nepotism, repression and appeasement of the United States. Could his regime be the next to fall after Saddam Hussein’s? And if so, will the Yemeni people be entitled to some $20 billion stashed away in German and Dutch banks?

[F.N]

اللهم أجعلها وبالاً عليه يارب العالمين

[يمني منسي]

في حال الصمت من الشعب والاذعان لهذا الشخص ستزداد ثروته بشكل مستمر ولاكن نسال الله ان يحرمه منها وتعود للشعب

[goldberg211]

انشاء الله 20مليار جهنم في قبره ومجوع الشعب الله المستعان فين الشرعيه اللي دخلوبها البلاد لاكن مومنه الله يسامح اللي وحدنا معاه اخذ بضاعه ماقلب

[بيحاني جنوبي]

«®°·.¸.•°°·.¸¸.•°°·.¸.•°®»اولا احمد الله على صحوت اهل الجنوب واقول من اين له كل هذه الاموال

لعنة الله على الحرامي «®°·.¸.•°°·.¸¸.•°°·.¸.•°®»

[ساري اليمن]

تبلغ ثروة السارق الكبير 22مليار وله نسبه من شركة مرسيدس ويملك مقاطعه في المانيا

[أحمد الهيثمي العوذلي]

الله المستعان

[jasan]

الرجاء من الي يكتب المقال ان يضيف اكثر من مصدر وبدون تعليق............

[gamal]

اقتباس   المشاركة الأصلية كتبت بواسطة صوت الجنوب 20مليار دولار ثروة الرئيس في بنوك أوروبا هذا هو المصدر اخي هارون [فقط الأعضاء المسجلين والمفعلين يمكنهم رؤية الوصلات . إضغط هنا للتسجيل] August 2004 Writing on the wall for Yemeni president Sheikh Badreddin al-Houthi is an eminent scholar of the Zaidi Shiite denomination of Islam. Clerics and believers have long flocked to his home in the mountainous northern Yemeni district of Saada to discuss matters of faith and community affairs. But recently the Sheikh has been inundated with visitors for different reasons. They have been arriving in droves to express their outrage at the military offensive launched by President Ali Abdallah Saleh against the district, and specifically against his son Hussein and his acolytes. Hussein al-Houthi had followed in his father’s footsteps. Over the years he emerged as an influential religious ******, running a network of religious centres and preaching at mosques throughout the northern and central parts of the country. He was also elected to parliament in 1993 and served until 1997. His sermons typically ended with the congregation chanting anti-American and anti-Israeli slogans. Such scenes had gradually become commonplace, notably in the capital Sanaa, without provoking any backlash from the state. Hence the surprise at the president’s sudden change of attitude. This occurred after he returned from the US, where he was one of the Third World ******s invited to attend the G-8 summit. When he got back he faced a barrage of criticism for his behaviour at the summit and mockery over his decision to attend it clad in “traditional” attire. One of the first things he proceeded to do was threaten military action against Houthi and his supporters. It seemed an impetuous move, starkly at odds with the way things are normally done in Yemen. For months, go-betweens had been interceding between the authorities and Houthi over the latter’s anti-Americanism, which hardly amounted to “incitement” as it reflected the sentiments of many Yemenis outraged at the’ US behaviour in Iraq. Palestine and elsewhere. The real issue appears to have been Houthi’s contention that Saleh is unfit to govern on religious grounds. His Zaidi doctrine, while in some respects closer to Sunni Islam than other strands of Shiism, shares aspects of the Shiite belief in an Imamate vested in descendants of the Prophet Muhammad –- a definition which could be applied to many leading Yemeni tribes but not Saleh’s Sanhan clan. Such a disqualification, even from a minority religious ******, is unhelpful to a president who seized power 26 years ago amid a succession of bloody power-struggles, runs a highly nepotistic regime, and makes little secret of his desire to bequeath his job to his son Col. Ahmad Saleh. Saleh also seems to have persuaded the Americans that Hussein al-Houthi was part of a plot by the Iranians to spread their brand of Shiism and politics in Yemen, and that Tehran had been arming his followers. The Zaidi ****** is sympathetic to aspects of the Twelver Shiism prevalent in Iran, but ironically it was Saleh himself who first allowed the Islamic Republic to establish medical and cultural centres throughout Yemen and thus seek to spread its political creed. But he appears to have thought it useful to pose as a bastion against Iranian influence, just as he did earlier with regard to al-Qaida. While many Yemenis balked at what they saw as their president’s resort to sectarian incitement, they were equally aghast at his boast that a punitive military assault against Hussein al-Houthi would resolve everything. The campaign turned into fiasco, making a mockery of the state and a hero of the dissident cleric. The Zaidi ******, by no means a warlord, continues to date to hold out. Most of the hundreds of casualties have been on the government side, and the president eventually resorted to hiring and arming tribal irregulars to throw into the battle. One tribe that was recruited for the purpose lost its sheikh in the fighting. Saleh even persuaded a young son of the ****** of Yemen’s largest tribal confederation, Sheikh Abdallah al-Ahmar, to send some of his clansmen to join the campaign. Between 30 and 35 of them were killed. When his father found out, while undergoing medical treatment in Saudi Arabia, he was incandescent. He sent an emissary to rein the boy in pending his return. Many Yemeni tribal and religious ******s can be expected to follow the lead set by Ahmar, who is also speaker of the Yemeni parliament, and demand that the state engage the dissident Zaidi cleric in dialogue. Houthi’s followers had not, after all, initiated any violence, and he had not declared any rebellion. His dissent was verbal and his reasoning religious, and his views about the president were by no means unique. Indeed, Saleh may have moved against him because he felt he was opening the floodgates to public denunciation of his regime and thus bringing its demise closer. Some regime insiders go further, suggesting that Houthi was brought to centre-stage as part of the fierce rivalry for power and influence between the president’s cousin Ali Muhsin, who commands the northwestern military sector, and his son Ahmad. Ali Muhsin was in charge of planning and carrying out the operation ordered by the president, which was conducted in a manner that risks dragging Yemen into sectarian and tribal conflict. As a reputed Zaidi convert to Wahhabism, Ali Muhsin is considered hostile to all forms of Shiism. They note that he was also the commander who failed spectacularly a few years ago to prevent Eritrea’s seizure of the Hanish islands off the Red Sea coast, amid allegations that he was bribed by the Saudis to facilitate the move in a bid to humiliate Saleh. With Ahmad being groomed for the succession by his father, Ali Muhsin may have seen Houthi’s “rebellion” as a suitable vehicle for his ambitions. Hussein al-Houthi may or may not survive, but his message has certainly been amplified by the campaign against him. It rings true to many Yemenis, and echoes their multiple grievances against the regime. The writing may be on the wall for a president who has held power for a quarter of a century through a combination of nepotism, repression and appeasement of the United States. Could his regime be the next to fall after Saddam Hussein’s? And if so, will the Yemeni people be entitled to some $20 billion stashed away in German and Dutch banks?

الترجمة: الإنجليزية » العربية
August 2004 Writing on the wall for Yemeni president Sheikh Badreddin al-Houthi is an eminent scholar of the Zaidi Shiite denomination of Islam. Clerics and believers have long flocked to his home in the mountainous northern Yemeni district of Saada to discuss matters of faith and community affairs. But recently the Sheikh has been inundated with visitors for different reasons. They have been arriving in droves to express their outrage at the military offensive launched by President Ali Abdallah Saleh against the district, and specifically against his son Hussein and his acolytes. Hussein al-Houthi had followed in his father’s footsteps. Over the years he emerged as an influential religious ******, running a network of religious centres and preaching at mosques throughout the northern and central parts of the country. He was also elected to parliament in 1993 and served until 1997. His sermons typically ended with the congregation chanting anti-American and anti-Israeli slogans. Such scenes had gradually become commonplace, notably in the capital Sanaa, without provoking any backlash from the state. Hence the surprise at the president’s sudden change of attitude. This occurred after he returned from the US, where he was one of the Third World ******s invited to attend the G-8 summit. When he got back he faced a barrage of criticism for his behaviour at the summit and mockery over his decision to attend it clad in “traditional” attire. One of the first things he proceeded to do was threaten military action against Houthi and his supporters. It seemed an impetuous move, starkly at odds with the way things are normally done in Yemen. For months, go-betweens had been interceding between the authorities and Houthi over the latter’s anti-Americanism, which hardly amounted to “incitement” as it reflected the sentiments of many Yemenis outraged at the’ US behaviour in Iraq. Palestine and elsewhere. The real issue appears to have been Houthi’s contention that Saleh is unfit to govern on religious grounds. His Zaidi doctrine, while in some respects closer to Sunni Islam than other strands of Shiism, shares aspects of the Shiite belief in an Imamate vested in descendants of the Prophet Muhammad –- a definition which could be applied to many leading Yemeni tribes but not Saleh’s Sanhan clan. Such a disqualification, even from a minority religious ******, is unhelpful to a president who seized power 26 years ago amid a succession of bloody power-struggles, runs a highly nepotistic regime, and makes little secret of his desire to bequeath his job to his son Col. Ahmad Saleh. Saleh also seems to have persuaded the Americans that Hussein al-Houthi was part of a plot by the Iranians to spread their brand of Shiism and politics in Yemen, and that Tehran had been arming his followers. The Zaidi ****** is sympathetic to aspects of the Twelver Shiism prevalent in Iran, but ironically it was Saleh himself who first allowed the Islamic Republic to establish medical and cultural centres throughout Yemen and thus seek to spread its political creed. But he appears to have thought it useful to pose as a bastion against Iranian influence, just as he did earlier with regard to al-Qaida. While many Yemenis balked at what they saw as their president’s resort to sectarian incitement, they were equally aghast at his boast that a punitive military assault against Hussein al-Houthi would resolve everything. The campaign turned into fiasco, making a mockery of the state and a hero of the dissident cleric. The Zaidi ******, by no means a warlord, continues to date to hold out. Most of the hundreds of casualties have been on the government side, and the president eventually resorted to hiring and arming tribal irregulars to throw into the battle. One tribe that was recruited for the purpose lost its sheikh in the fighting. Saleh even persuaded a young son of the ****** of Yemen’s largest tribal confederation, Sheikh Abdallah al-Ahmar, to send some of his clansmen to join the campaign. Between 30 and 35 of them were killed. When his father found out, while undergoing medical treatment in Saudi Arabia, he was incandescent. He sent an emissary to rein the boy in pending his return. Many Yemeni tribal and religious ******s can be expected to follow the lead set by Ahmar, who is also speaker of the Yemeni parliament, and demand that the state engage the dissident Zaidi cleric in dialogue. Houthi’s followers had not, after all, initiated any violence, and he had not declared any rebellion. His dissent was verbal and his reasoning religious, and his views about the president were by no means unique. Indeed, Saleh may have moved against him because he felt he was opening the floodgates to public denunciation of his regime and thus bringing its demise closer. Some regime insiders go further, suggesting that Houthi was brought to centre-stage as part of the fierce rivalry for power and influence between the president’s cousin Ali Muhsin, who commands the northwestern military sector, and his son Ahmad. Ali Muhsin was in charge of planning and carrying out the operation ordered by the president, which was conducted in a manner that risks dragging Yemen into sectarian and tribal conflict. As a reputed Zaidi convert to Wahhabism, Ali Muhsin is considered hostile to all forms of Shiism. They note that he was also the commander who failed spectacularly a few years ago to prevent Eritrea’s seizure of the Hanish islands off the Red Sea coast, amid allegations that he was bribed by the Saudis to facilitate the move in a bid to humiliate Saleh. With Ahmad being groomed for the succession by his father, Ali Muhsin may have seen Houthi’s “rebellion” as a suitable vehicle for his ambitions. Hussein al-Houthi may or may not survive, but his message has certainly been amplified by the campaign against him. It rings true to many Yemenis, and echoes their multiple grievances against the regime. The writing may be on the wall for a president who has held power for a quarter of a century through a combination of nepotism, repression and appeasement of the United States. Could his regime be the next to fall after Saddam Hussein’s? And if so, will the Yemeni people be entitled to some $20 billion stashed away in German and Dutch banks?
اب / اغسطس 2004
الكتابة على الجدار للالرئيس اليمني

الشيخ badreddin - Al houthi هو باحث بارز من zaidi المذهب الشيعي للاسلام. ورجال الدين والمؤمنين flocked منذ وقت طويل الى منزله في المنطقة الجبليه الشمالية اليمني سعادة لمناقشة المسائل الدينية وشؤون المجتمعات المحلية. ولكن في الآونة الاخيرة ان الشيخ قد مفيض مع الزوار لاسباب مختلفة. كانت الجموع هاءله في الوصول الى التعبير عن غضبهم ازاء الهجوم العسكرى الذى شنته الرئيس علي عبد الله صالح ضد المقاطعه ، وعلى وجه التحديد ضد ابنه حسين والمساعدون. الدكتور حسين houthi قد اتبع والده في دراساته. وقال انه على مر السنين ظهر زعيم ديني مؤثر ، وتدير شبكة من المراكز الدينية والوعظ في المساجد فى جميع أنحاء شمال ووسط البلاد. كما انه كان من المنتخبات للبرلمان فى عام 1993 وعملت حتى عام 1997. له خطب وعادة ما انتهت مع تجمع الهتاف المعادى لامريكا وشعارات معاديه لاسرائيل. ان تلك المشاهد قد أصبح شائعا بصورة تدريجيه ، ولا سيما في العاصمة صنعاء ، من دون اثارة اي رد فعل عنيف من جانب الدولة. ومن هنا تأتي دهشته من الرئيس التغير المفاجئ في الموقف. وحدث ذلك بعد عودته من الولايات المتحدة ، حيث كان واحدا من قادة العالم الثالث الى حضور مؤتمر القمة ز - 8. وعندما حصل على العودة وقال انه واجه سيلا من الانتقادات لسلوكه في مؤتمر القمة وعلى مدى استهزاء قراره للحضور انه مكسو "التقليديه" الملابس. واحدة من أولى الأمور وقال انه كان يبدأ القيام بعمل عسكري ضد تهدد houthi وانصاره. Impetuous انه بدأ التحرك ، صارخ يتعارض مع الامور عادة القيام به في اليمن.
لعدة اشهر ، انتقل - betweens تم التوسط بين السلطات وعلى مدى houthi الاخير ضد امريكا ، والتي تكاد تصل الى "التحريض" لانها تعبر عن مشاعر استياء العديد من اليمنيين في الولايات المتحدة او في سلوك العراق. فلسطين واماكن اخرى. القضية الحقيقية ويبدو انها كانت houthi ادعاء ان صالح لائق للتحكم على اسس دينية. Zaidi مذهب له ، في حين انه في بعض الجوانب اقرب الى الاسلام السني من صيغ اخرى للshiism ، اسهم جوانب المعتقد الشيعي في imamate المخوله من نسل النبي محمد -- تعريف التي يمكن تطبيقها مما يؤدي الى كثير من القبائل اليمنية ولكن ليس صالح 'Sanhan العشائر. هذه التنحيه ، وحتى من زعيم الاقليه الدينية ، ليست مفيدة على الرئيس من استولى على السلطة قبل 26 عاما وسط سلسلة من الصراعات الدمويه في السلطة ، وتدير النظام محسوبي للغاية ، ويذكر للسر رغبته في نورث وظيفته لصاحب نجل العقيد أحمد صالح.

اشار صالح الى ما يبدو الى اقناع الاميركيين بأن الدكتور حسين houthi هو جزء من مءامره من جانب الايرانيين على لانتشار العلامه التجارية للshiism والسياسة في اليمن ، وكان ان طهران بتسليح اتباعه. وقد zaidi زعيم تتعاطف جوانب من twelver shiism الساءده في ايران ، ولكن من المفارقات صالح نفسه كان اول من سمح للجمهورية الاسلامية لانشاء المراكز الطبية والثقافيه في جميع أنحاء اليمن ، وبالتالي تسعى الى نشر العقيدة السياسية. ولكن يبدو أنه كان يعتقد انه من المفيد ان تطرح نفسها بوصفها حصنا ضد النفوذ الايراني ، تماما كما كان يفعل في وقت سابق فيما يتعلق بتنظيم القاعده. وفي حين ان العديد من اليمنيين تقاعس في ما هو رأي الرئيس اللجوء الى التحريض الطائفي ، كانت في بلدة على قدم المساواة aghast ان تتباهي عقابيه ضد الهجوم العسكرى حسين houthi من شأنه ان يحل كل شيء. الحملة تحولت الى الاخفاق التام ، مما جعل سخريه من الدولة وبطلا من رجل الدين المنشق. فان زعيم zaidi ، بأي حال من الاحوال امير الحرب ، ولا يزال حتى الآن على عقد. أكثر من مئات الاصابات كانت على جانب الحكومة ، والرئيس في نهاية المطاف لجأت الى تسليح القبائل والتعاقد معهم ، والجنود غير النظاميين لرمى الى المعركه. ان قبيلة واحدة وعين لهذا الغرض فقد الشيخ في القتال. صالح حتى اقناع شاب ابن زعيم اكبر القبائل اليمنية ، الاتحاد ، والشيخ عبدالله الأحمر ، الى ارسال بعض من clansmen الى الانضمام للحملة. بين 30 و 35 منهم قتلوا. والده عندما اكتشفت ، في حين يخضع للعلاج الطبى فى المملكه العربية السعودية ، وكان ساطع. وقال انه ارسل مبعوثا لكبح جماح الفتى في انتظار عودته. كثير من القبائل اليمنية والزعماء الدينيين يمكن ان يتوقع على ان تحذو حذو التي حددتها الاحمر ، من هو ايضا رئيس مجلس النواب اليمني ، ومطالبة الدولة المنشقه zaidi اشراك رجال الدين في الحوار. Houthi لم اتباعه ، بعد كل شيء ، بدا أي عنف ، وقال انه لم يعلن اى تمرد. بلدة المعارضة اللفظيه وكان صاحب المنطق الديني ، وآراؤه عن الرئيس ولم تكن وسيلة فريدة من نوعها.

والواقع ان صالح قد تحركت ضده لأنه رأى انه فتح على مصراعيه العامة الى الانسحاب من نظامه ، وبذلك سقوطه اوثق. بعض المطلعين على اسرار الذهاب الى ابعد من ذلك النظام ، مما يوحي بأن houthi وقد وجه المركز - المرحلة كجزء من المنافسة الشرسه من اجل السلطة والنفوذ بين ابن عم الرئيس علي محسن ، من الأوامر العسكرية القطاع الشمالي الغربي ، وابنه احمد. علي محسن كان مسؤولا عن تخطيط وتنفيذ العملية التي امرت بها الرئيس ، الذي اجري في نحو وجر اليمن الى مخاطر الطاءفيه والصراع القبلي. كما سمعة حسنة zaidi ان تتحول الى وهابيه ، علي محسن تعتبر معاديه لجميع اشكال shiism. وهم يلاحظون ايضا انه كان قائد من فشل مذهله منذ بضع سنوات لمنع الاستيلاء على اريتريا على جزر حنيش من ساحل البحر الأحمر ، وسط مزاعم انه رشوة من السعوديين لتسهيل التحرك في محاولة لاذلال صالح . مع أحمد ويجري اعدادهم لخلافة والده ، علي محسن قد شاهدوا houthi "التمرد" بانه اداة مناسبة لطموحات بلده. الدكتور حسين houthi يمكن أو لا يمكن البقاء على قيد الحياة ، لكن رسالته بالتأكيد تضخيم من قبل حملة ضده. انها عصابات حقيقية للكثير من اليمنيين ، وأصداء المتعددة شكاوى ضد النظام. قد تكون الكتابة على الجدار لعقد الرئيس من السلطة لربع قرن من خلال مزيج من المحسوبيه والقمع واسترضاء الولايات المتحدة. ويمكن ان يكون نظامه المقبل الى بعد سقوط صدام حسين؟ وإذا كان الأمر كذلك ، فهل يكون من حق الشعب اليمني الى 20 مليار دولار بعض stashed بعيدا في المصارف الالمانيه والهولنديه؟

تمت الترجمة بواسطة صاحبنا الشيخ جوجل ولاباس بها شي أحسن من لاشي

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