صلة تنظيم القاعدة باليمن

[أنا هو]

أميركا لا تحتاج إلى عملاء في اليمن !

Sunday, April 02-
" التغيير" ـ خاص ـ يحي غالب احمد المحامي: العمالة والخيانة والانفصال والحوثية والأمامية وغيرها كلها تهم جاهزة معلبه يتم توزيعها من قبل النظام الحاكم في أي لحظه بمناسبة أو بدونها على كل صاحب رأي أو موقف سياسي معارض بوجهة نظر 0توزع هذه التهم كما

توزع الرتب والنياشين والألقاب لمن خاضوا حرب صعده أو استبسلوا بإحراق الجنوب وتدمير كيان دوله وبنى تحتية لمؤسسات ونظام وهيئات واستبدال الوحدة السلمية بوحدة القوه والضم والإلحاق ومن يتكلم عن ما قبل 7يوليو94يعتبر انفصالي وخائن وليس كذلك فحسب بل أن علي سالم البيض نائب رئيس اليمن ومن قام بإبرام عقد الوحدة والشراكة بين الجنوب والشمال ممثلا شرعيا لدولة الجنوب يعتبر خائنا وعميلا ومطلوب قضائيا ومحكوم عليه بالإعدام رميا بالرصاص حتى الموت..
كنت لا أتوقع أن تصل الاتهامات بهذه الوصفات الجاهزة إلى بسطاء الناس شباب ينحتون بالصخر بشرف وكرامة يجسدون انتمائهم لوطن مذبوح مستباح وطن متهتك ونازف ينهار وهم يمسكون بجسده وأعلنوا ولائهم له وانتمائهم الروحي لمثل هكذا وطن ..
صحيفة أخبار اليوم وما قالته عن الصحفي عرفات مدابش واتهمته بالعمالة والخيانة لمصلحة الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية بدون دليل ولا وعي لمثل هذه التهم التي عقوبتها الإعدام بل لمجرد مزاج مخبرين يائسين اختصروا طريق الوصول إلى الحقائق بهذه الأقاويل التي تسيء إلى الوطن وتزرع عدم الانتماء والتذمر. وهذه الأساليب ما هي إلا ذر الرماد على العيون ومحاوله بائسة لاستغفال العقل ومحاولة لصنع خصوم لأمريكا واستنفار الشعب ناحيتها بينما الشعب العدو اللدود لأمريكا بات يعرف جيدا من هم عملا أمريكا الحقيقيين . وعرفات مدابش لا يملك طائره بدون طيار ولم يقوم بإطلاق الصواريخ لقتل الحارثي بل التقى بشجاعة بمن تبقى من أتباع الحارثي المجاهدين وقود ورماد
جمور النظام المغرر بهم إلى محارق كابول وقندهار ومحارق العند ودوفس . بات الشعب يعرف من هم عملاء أمريكا الحقيقيين الذين لا يسمحون لأحد منافستهم هذه المهمة وأمريكا تتعاون مع النظام ضد معارضيه فالفرقة الأولى مدرع التي قالت عنها أمريكا بأنها وكر الإرهاب أصبحت مزارا لرجال السفارة الأمريكية ولم تعد مكانا مشبوها وهذه هي أبجديات السياسة والمصالح وعدو الأمس صديق اليوم ، وللأمانة وللتاريخ هذا شي ايجابي للبلدين أمريكا واليمن بان هناك تعاونا وتنسيقا بل ومساندة أمريكية لليمن وعدم تعاون مع المعارضة داخليا وخارجيا فأمريكا دولة تحكم العالم تعرف مصالحها وحماية تلك المصالح فلا تركن للاشتراكي أو الناصري أو للأحزاب الضعيفة ولا تريدها إلا نموذجا للمعارضة العربية والديمقراطيات الناشئة وحقول تجارب للنظريات الأمريكية.
أمريكا لا يهمها حرب الجنوب إطلاقا لا من قريب ولا من بعيد ولا تهمها حرب صعده المدمرة بل قد تكون مستفيدة لتصفية حسابات مع الاشتراكي الذي قطع علاقات الجنوب مع أمريكا وإسرائيل طيلة سنين حكمه للجنوب وكذا مستفيدة من حرب صعده كونها أخمدت من قالوا الموت لأمريكا وإسرائيل..
لماذا يتم وضع أمريكا شماعة للفشل السياسي وتحويلها إلى مصدر خوف يهدد النظام بينما هي مصدر أمان وبقاء وديمومة النظام الحاكم 0؟ولماذا سياسة استغفال العقول مستمرة بهذه الفجاجة والسخف وجعل عرفات مدابش الصحفي والكاتب المجتهد وتصنيفه عميلا لأمريكا ؟!
إن الشراكة في مكافحة الإرهاب هي حجر الزاوية بالعلاقات اليمنية الأمريكية ونحن نعرف من هم ضحايا الإرهاب والعالم أصبح يشير بالبنان إلى جريمة اغتيال جار الله عمر أمين عام مساعد الحزب الاشتراكي جار الله الذي كانوا يقولون عنه صديق الأمريكان وحليفهم وهذا القول ليس إلا مجرد وسيلة تحريضية لقوى الإرهاب ونزع الوطنية عن جار الله عمر وتهيئة الشارع نفسيا بقبول الجريمة البشعة !
ماذا عمل الأمريكان في قضية جار الله عمر لم يحركوا ساكنا سوى برقية عزاء وكلام لا يسمن ولا يغني من جوع ونلاحظ كيف حركت أمريكا مجلس الأمن في قضية الحريري رجل المال والبزنس واتخذ مجلس الأمن قرارات سريعة وفاعله للتحقيق بالقضية والكشف عنها ولكنها علاقات المصالح المترابطة. وعرفات مدابش والدكتور عبد الله الفقيه وغيرهم من رواد الكلمة والرأي يفترض أن تعطيهم السلطة حجمهم الطبيعي لا تزايد باتهامهم بالعمالة لأمريكا لان الناس تتساءل ماذا بيدهم ليقدموه لأمريكا؟
ونحن لا نريد العلاقة بين السلطة وأمريكا تتعقد إطلاقا لان مصالح البلد هي مصالحنا الاستقرار والأمن والحياة وكوننا بشر نحب الحياة بطعم وذوق خاص ونكهة أفضل من المتمصلحين والمشبوهين ، ونرى أن استقرار العلاقات الأمريكية اليمنية هي مصدر الأمان والاستقرار الاجتماعي لنا ولأجيالنا. أما السلطة فلديها ما يمكنها من حماية نفسها ومستقبل مصالحها ولكي تطمئن أكثر تعمل على استعداء الشعب ضد أمريكا لكي تبقى هي المقبولة أمريكيا وتعمل على استعداء أمريكا ضدا لمعارضه وضد رواد المجتمع المدني والأحزاب المعارضة. فالعلاقات المتبادلة الناجحة بين اليمن وأمريكا أساسها المصالح وحمايتها . لذلك فالسلطة وإعلامها تستنسخ عملاء نيابة عنها لاستغفال العقول وتصور أمريكا وحش كاسر تستعدي عليه الشعب لتضرب الشعب بأمريكا وتقيم علاقات وطيدة ومصالح مع أمريكا في نفس الوقت لتطمئن السلطة أن ليس بمقدور احد غيرها أن يكون عميلا لأمريكا
* عضو اللجنة المركزية للحزب الاشتراكي اليمني.

[أنا هو]

ظل غياب أية معلومات ؟
مجلي يسلم نفسه للسلطات الامنية؟

الشورى نت -متابعات ( 02/04/2006 )
لازال الغموض يكتنف مسألة تسليم بعض الفارين من سجن الأمن السياسي مطلع فبراير الماضي انفسهم للسلطات الامنية .

وحسب سبتمبر نت فقد سلم الفار حزام صالح مجلي نفسه خلال اليومين الماضيين للسلطات , وبذلك يكون مجليالسادس في جملة من سلموا انفسهم من الـ 23 الفارين من سجن الأمن السياسي بصنعاء .

ولم يفصح الموقع عن اية معلومات اضافية حول مجلي سوى انه كان قد حكم عليه بالاعدام في قضية تفجير ناقلة النفط الفرنسية ليمبورج مع عنصر اخر من الجماعات الارهابية هو فواز الربيعي .

يذكر ان الـ 23 سجينا الذين فروا في ظروف غامضة من سجن الأمن السياسي هم من العناصر التي لها صلة بتنظيم القاعدة وبالتنظيمات والجماعات الارهابية في اليمن.

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Yemen's Passive Role in the War on Terrorism

By Gregory D. Johnsen

For the past five years, Yemen has been what is best described as a passive partner in the U.S.-led war on terrorism. It has taken a number of steps to limit the activities of al Qaeda and other like-minded groups within the country, but most of these have been at the behest of the U.S., and it is often schizophrenic in its pursuit of Islamic militants. In April 2004, Prime Minister Abd al-Qadir Bajammal claimed that Yemen had eradicated 90 percent of the al-Qaeda organization in the country. Yet rumors that factions within the country’s political and security establishment assisted in the recent jailbreak of 23 militants, including prominent figures in the attacks on the USS Cole and the Limburg, have once again raised questions about Yemen's reliability as an ally in the war on terrorism (Terrorism Focus, February 7).

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Yemen was often mentioned in the same breath as Afghanistan as a possible hideout for al-Qaeda. Many Yemenis, including prominent government officials, felt their country was next on a "hit list" after the U.S. finished in Afghanistan. That fear has been expressed more recently by President Ali Abdullah Saleh, during a speech in Aden in December 2005, when he claimed that he dissuaded the U.S. from occupying the country following the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000 (al-Arabiya, December 1, 2005).

The country's fears stemmed from a long and close history with Islamic militants. Following the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, many of these fighters—known as Afghan Arabs—made their way back to their countries of origin, full of religious zeal and the thrill of victory, and eager to replicate their successes at home. The governments of the Arab world, however, were not as excited with the prospect of a local jihad within their borders. Massive crackdowns by many of these governments forced a number of the Afghan Arabs to flee their countries yet again. Many of them seized on an apocryphal hadith of the Prophet Muhammad: "When disorder threatens, seek refuge in Yemen." Even Osama bin Laden has alluded to the ideas expressed in the hadith and the situation in Yemen during the mid-1990s when he told Abd al-Bari Atwan of al-Quds al-Arabi in an interview in November 1996 that he would like to live in Yemen because it was one of the few places in the Arab world where one could still breathe the air of freedom.
The Yemeni government largely welcomed these fighters, and in 1994 it managed to turn them into an effective paramilitary force that helped the government put down a secession attempt by the socialist south. The Afghan Arabs were led by Sheikh Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, who has since been listed as a "specially designated global terrorist" by both the U.S. and the UN, and Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, a close relative of the president and one of the most powerful military ******s in the country. Both men had extensive contacts among the fighters. Al-Zindani made frequent trips to Afghanistan in the 1980s and early 1990s, and, according to the U.S. Treasury Department, has been a "spiritual ******" of bin Laden. Al-Ahmar is married to the sister of Tariq al-Fadhli, one of the most prominent Yemeni veterans of the war in Afghanistan, and the former head of the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army.

Yet, much like U.S. support for the Afghan Arabs in the 1980s, Yemen's use of these fighters has since come back to haunt the government.

In addition to the attack on the USS Cole, which killed 17 sailors, the French oil tanker Limburg was also attacked in 2002, resulting in the death of a Bulgarian sailor who drowned after jumping overboard. Not everyone, however, attributes the attack on the Limburg directly to al-Qaeda operatives in Yemen. Nasser al- Bahri, bin Laden's former chief bodyguard, who is also known as Abu Jandal, claimed in an interview with al-Quds al-Arabi in 2004 that the bombing was a rash reaction to the killing of Yahya Saleh Al-Mujalli, a local al-Qaeda operative, by government forces in Sana'a in late September 2002.
Earlier that year, Yemen had invited U.S. Special Forces into the country as advisers and trainers, and following the attack on the Limburg, it cooperated with the unmanned Predator drone strike on Ali Qaid Sinan al-Harithi, the suspected head of al-Qaeda in Yemen, and five of his companions in November 2002. The Yemeni government paid a high price domestically for allowing the U.S. to strike inside Yemen's borders, following a leak from the Pentagon that broke the agreement of secrecy between the two countries. President Saleh felt personally betrayed by the leak, and when Yemen captured al-Harithi's replacement, Mohammad Hamdi al-Ahdal, one year later in November 2003, it refused to allow U.S. officials to interrogate him directly.

The recent escape of 23 prisoners occurred only a day before al-Ahdal was due to stand trial. In the aftermath of the prison break, there has been a great deal of confusion as to whether al-Ahdal escaped or not. Hussein al-Jarbani of al-Sharq al-Awsat, reported on February 5 that al-Ahdal was among the escapees. On February 4, the Yemen Times also published what it called the "official list" of the escapees, noting that the list contained only 22 names, "excluding [Mohammad] Hamdi al-Ahdal." Other agencies, however, have stated that the judiciary has merely delayed his trial by a week, and that he is still in custody. On February 13, the Yemeni government finally announced that al-Ahdal was still in custody, as it officially began his trial under extremely tight security.

Al-Ahdal was originally captured in 2003, reportedly on a tip from a former militant who had recently been granted his freedom under a government program, Religious Dialogue Council (RDC), headed by Hamoud al-Hitar. The program, which was initiated at the request of President Saleh in September 2002, is designed to convince suspected militants that carrying out violent actions in the name of Islam is not sanctioned by the Quran or the Sunna. It has since released 364 suspected militants in six separate pardons, following their pledges to abstain from violence. Bin Laden's former bodyguard, al-Bahri, is one such graduate. The RDC, which was initially started as part of a multi-pronged approach to remove Yemen from a "hit list" in Washington, appears to have been caught up in its perceived success through a combination of Western media reports and fewer terrorist attacks in Yemen from late 2002 to early 2005. This early euphoria led to the release of more and more detainees in greater frequency, and eventually to Bajammal's claim that Yemen was 90 percent al-Qaeda free.

Yet by the summer of 2005, as the war in Iraq continued to drag on, the RDC ran into problems. On June 1, 2005, al-Hitar told the Khaleej Times: "Resistance in Iraq is legitimate, but we cannot differentiate between terrorism and resistance in Iraq's situation because things are not clear in this case." Within a few months, however, his views had shifted slightly and he would only say: "Iraq is not a subject of the dialogue" (AP, October 11, 2005).
This shift in thinking, or at least public descriptions of the dialogue sessions, seems to have been brought about by an incident in July 2005 when two former detainees, which al-Hitar had recommended for release, carried out a suicide bombing on U.S. forces in Baghdad. Al-Hitar initially denied this claim, which was originally reported by "anonymous Yemeni security sources" in the armed forces weekly paper 26th of September (October 13, 2005).

Yet Jamal al-Amir, the editor of the weekly independent newspaper al-Wasat, has argued that the story is true, and that at least eight men from al-Hitar's program have found their way to Iraq to fight U.S. forces there.
These revelations have essentially spelled the end of al-Hitar's program. In December 2005, while al-Hitar was in Washington participating in a State Department sponsored conference on religious dialogue, Khalid al-Hammadi of al-Quds al-Arabi reported that sources within Yemen's security forces were convinced that al-Hitar's program had failed, and that it should be stopped (al-Quds al-Arabi, December 10, 2005). The sources pointed to the fact that al-Hitar had not been able to persuade the released militants to renounce violence, as a number of the former detainees were still in Iraq fighting. Yemen, of course, has worked extremely hard to keep its young men from traveling to Iraq, turning away suspicious passengers at the airport. Yet the borders are simply too porous to keep everyone in the country and out of Iraq.

The threat of violence is no longer one-way. In January 2006, Yemen announced that it had arrested 19 men, who had recently returned from Iraq and were planning to carry out terrorist attacks in the country. The men were reportedly acting on the orders of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and his al-Qaeda in Iraq organization. One of the targets was a hotel in Aden frequented by Westerners; the men also had instructions to kill U.S. citizens. The Yemen Observer, which has recently been closed by order of the prime minister as a result of a story on the "cartoon riots," reported that one of the men, Ali Abdullah Asyan, called himself "Abu Ali al-Harithi, Jr." in honor of the slain al-Qaeda commander (The Yemen Observer, January 28, 2006).

The return route of fighters from Iraq to Yemen with the intention of striking Western targets in the country suggests that Yemen's period of relative calm could be nearing an end. It is too soon to tell if this is a new generation of fighters, as the "junior" in Asyan's assumed name would suggest, but what is clear is that Yemen has not destroyed 90 percent of al-Qaeda in the country.
Furthermore, following the recent prison break, it is not even clear if the Yemeni government is 90 percent al-Qaeda free. For Yemen to truly reach Bajammal's figure, it will have to cease being passive and become a more active ally.
Gregory D. Johnsen, a former Fulbright Fellow in Yemen, is currently an MA candidate in Near Eastern Studies at the University of Arizona.

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Al Qaeda Escape in Yemen: Facts, Rumors and Theories

[Jane Novak, Worldpress.org contributing editor, February 16, 2006.
One theory circulating in Yemen these days is that the recent escape of 23 prisoners from a maximum-security intelligence facility was orchestrated to transfer them to U.S. custody, circumventing Yemen's extradition laws. Certainly the U.S. would have an interest in obtaining custody of the escapees. Several were convicted of complicity in the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, which killed 17 U.S. service members on Oct. 12, 2000. Others include convicted bombers of a French oil tanker, the Lindburg. One was an American, Gaber Elbaneh, who was convicted in the U.S. of involvement in an Al Qaeda cell in Lackawana, New York.
After the jailbreak, the Yemeni government failed to provide Interpol with the prisoners' photographs fingerprints and other information that would have enabled an international red alert. Lacking the information, Interpol issued a lower, orange alert. If the regime had been acting in concert with the United States, it likely would have attempted to reap the publicity benefit of prompt cooperation with Interpol. Rather, there are many indications that the escape was carried out in concert with Al Qaeda sympathizers in the Yemeni security apparatus.
The prisoners were in custody of Yemen's Political Security Organization, an intelligence agency answerable directly to President Ali Abdullah Saleh. The P.S.O. reputedly engages in regime dirty work like beating journalists and harassing political opponents. In theory, the escapees used cooking utensils to break through a thick concrete floor and to tunnel 460 feet. The tunnel exited in the nearby mosque of a prominent preacher, Judge Hamoud al-Hittar, who is reported to have "close ties to security officials" according to a published report. A U.S. Embassy cable sent from Yemen's capital, Sanaa that was described to Newsweek noted "the lack of obvious security measures on the streets" after the escape and concluded: "One thing is certain: P.S.O. insiders must have been involved."
After the escape, the Yemeni Interior Minister, Rashad al-Alemi, was promoted to deputy prime minister, while retaining his position as Interior Minister. A few prison guards were charged with "slackness" on their jobs. Over 200 of the escapees' relatives and associates have been detained for questioning; the Yemeni government has denied a U.S. request to interrogate them, citing sovereignty concerns. Published reports initially indicated that some of the prisoners were captured on the day of the escape; no official statements were made, leading to speculation that the prisoners had been re-released. Other unconfirmed reports include a phone call from the escapees to a high ranking official of the P.S.O. to advise of their success, and the installation of electric lines in the prison in the weeks prior to the escape, the continuous drilling for which may have covered the sounds of the escapees own drilling and power tools.
Yemen has increased its cooperation in the War on Terror since the Sept. 11 attacks, making some progress with arrests, intelligence sharing, counter terrorism cooperation, and setting up a coast guard. Yemen recently brought to trial a suspected high-ranking Al Qaeda ******, Mohammed Hamdi al-Ahdal. U.S. officials have reported, however, that Yemen's cooperation is neither institutionalized nor consistent. To the extent that cooperation is ongoing however sporadic, a pattern of escapes and terrorist facilitation may render cooperation a zero-sum game.
Pattern of Facilitation
Despite cooperative rhetoric when dealing with Western allies, the Yemeni government has not clamped down on terrorist financing, a primary strategy in disrupting terrorist operations. In 2003, in response to a U.N. directive to freeze 144 Al Qaeda or Taliban affiliated banks accounts the regime closed one. In 2004, it did not circulate the U.N.'s banking notice to the banks at all.
The Yemeni regime has issued false statements. According to the U.S. State Department's 2004 Patterns of Terrorism report, "In October 2003, despite repeated statements that [Aden Abyan Islamic Army] ****** Khalid Abd al-Nabi was dead, Yemeni officials revealed that he was not killed in the confrontations … Instead, al-Nabi surrendered to the Yemeni authorities, was released from custody, and is not facing charges for any of his activities." Similarly, Yemen failed for months to acknowledge to the United States that an American, Gaber Elbaneh, was in Yemeni custody, and has not replied to a U.S. request for extradition issued over a year ago.
Weaponry channeled through Yemen is supplying terrorists, as well as militants in Sudan, Somalia, the Palestinian Authority territories, Eritrea and Saudi Arabia. The wide scale enterprise, described as a weapons emporium, is reputed to be supervised by top military officials, many of whom are President Saleh's close relatives. Two AK-47 assault rifles used in a deadly attack on the U.S. consulate in Saudi Arabia have been traced to Yemen's Defense Ministry.
The Gulf States Newsletter reported that the P.S.O., "seeded with Salifists," is responsible for much of the "revolving door strategy" that has seen militants escape or be released to engage in recidivist militancy. One method of release is through Yemen's Dialog Committee, a rehabilitation program under the chairmanship of Judge Hamoud al-Hittar. As a result of the work of Al-Hittar, who engages in a Koranic dialog with imprisoned extremists, over 300 "rehabilitated" prisoners have been released. U.S. officials have complained that they did not get an opportunity to question some high level detainees released under the program.
In a 2003 interview, Al-Hittar told the Associated Press that he uses his dialogue sessions to try to persuade extremists not to attack Western or government interests inside Yemen. Recently Osama bin Laden's former bodyguard, Nasser al-Bahri, told the BBC that the authorities helped set him up as a small businessman, and that he has ceased militant activities. He said Judge Hittar did not seek to convert prisoners, but rather sought only to obtain a guarantee that they would not launch attacks on the West from Yemeni soil.
In 2003, Al Qaeda described President Saleh as "the only Arab and Muslim ****** who is not an agent for the West," and offered the Yemeni government a truce. If Yemen stopped hunting down suspected Al Qaeda militants, and released those already jailed, Al Qaeda would put an end to its attacks inside the country. Termination of military cooperation with the United States was another of Al Qaeda's conditions, the Yemen Times reported. There were eight in all. Judge al-Hittar remarked at the time, "Some of these conditions cannot be negotiated at all." Negotiations reportedly failed.
Use of Al Qaeda as an Internal Paramilitary Force
Another popular theory in Yemen explaining the escape is that the prisoners were released to be used against political opponents. Militant Islamist Ahmed Haidrah Abubakr, also known as Abulashaath, ****** of the Al Qaeda affiliated Abyan Aden Islamic Army said in an interview after his recent arrest, "We know that we were imprisoned again only to be used against those opposing the regime."
The regime has a history of employing militant Islamists as an internal fighting force. In the 1994 civil war in Yemen, President Saleh's northern forces gained victory over the South in part through the utilization of Afghan Arabs, proponents of jihad who had returned from Afghanistan and pledged their loyalty to the regime in return for continued influence.
A militant Islamist carried out the 2004 murder of Jarallah Omar, a leading opposition politician. Many observers believe it was part of a wider conspiracy. Amnesty International said that it had observed indications of complicity by regime figures and organizations that required a thorough investigation, but one has yet to be accomplished.
The Gulf States Newsletter, in its December issue, noted that the Yemeni government is currently employing Afghan Arabs alongside its military in battling the Houthist uprising in the north, "Some irregular units of former jihadists have been used against Zaydi militants in the Saada area." The military force in Saada includes former Iraqi generals and is under the command of the North West Region commander, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, who is President Saleh's half-brother, and a reputed Wahhabist. Al-Ahmar worked with Bin Laden recruiting Yeminis to fight in Afghanistan. After 9/11, as author and analyst Robert Kaplan notes, "Giving Ali Mohsen's regiment a chunk of the American military aid package was the only way that Washington could do business in Yemen."
Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani has labeled Mohsen's assault against Yemen's Shiites a jihad and military analyst James Dunnigan has called it "a religious conflict between radical Shia tribes, and pro-Al Qaeda Sunni Yemenis." It is important to note that the predominant religious affiliation in Yemen is Shaifi Sunni, a moderate and tolerant orientation, and the vast majority of Yeminis overall oppose the targeting of civilians within Yemen and beyond its borders. In remarking on the November terrorist attack in Jordan, Hosnia Al-Mikhlafi, a mother said, "How do these people think that they are Muslims while they terrorized innocent people? They killed infants on the laps of their mothers. If bin Laden and Zarqawi think that this is jihad, they should be resisted till we get rid of their evil deeds."
The Pipeline to Iraq
A third theory about the escape is that well trained and operationally capable Al Qaeda militants were needed to beef up insurgent operations in Iraq. President Saleh has had strong ties to Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq and he was one of the few Arab ******s to oppose the first Gulf War. In 2003, the United States noted, shipments of night vision goggles from Russia to Yemen were most likely transshipped to insurgents in Iraq. After the fall of Baghdad, top-level Iraqi generals were recruited into Yemen's military.
According to current estimates, about 20 percent of the foreign fighters in Iraq are of Yemeni origin. This figure does not include those who transit, train or receive material or logistical assistance, including travel documents, from Al Qaeda sympathizers in Yemen. One Yemeni official speaking anonymously to a local newspaper reported that Al Qaeda had subverted elements of the Yemeni security forces, which had established training camps for Baathists intent on joining the insurgency in Iraq. As a Saudi source reported to the press, "A young man decides he wants to fight in Iraq, illegally enters Yemen, travels to Syria, and is subsequently smuggled across the border into Iraq."
In November, the Iraqi Attorney General presented Interpol with an extradition request to bring Saddam Hussein's nephew, Omar Sabawi al-Tikriti, who is reportedly residing in Yemen, to Baghdad to stand trial for "committing acts of terror." Iraqi officials say that Al-Tikriti has played a leading role in, and financially supported the insurgency in Northern Iraq. Yemeni officials claim they have been unable to locate al-Tikriti.
Also in November, Al Tajamo, an opposition newspaper based in Aden conducted interviews with the families of Yemeni suicide bombers killed in Iraq. Family members reported that their sons and brothers were trained in suicide bombings with the knowledge of security officials and had logistical support from top military commanders known for their jihadist associations. From Aden and Abyan alone, nearly 100 fighters are thought to have gone to Iraq. Twenty-two are known to have been killed. According to the newspaper's informed source, safe houses were established in Sanaa to house the fighters until their travel arrangements could be finalized. The source said that many members of the Aden Abyan Islamic Army had joined Abu Musab al-Zarqawi's group in Iraq.
Lingering Questions About the Cole Bombing
Because the Yemeni government has not allowed the United States full access to some prisoners, another theory circulating is that the prisoners were allowed to escape to keep them away from U.S. investigators. The former head of Yemen's navy at the time of the Cole bombing, Ahmed al-Hasani, said in a press statement in May that President Saleh had prior knowledge of the Cole bombing, and that Saleh had sent high-level officials to Aden in the early morning hours before the attack.
Analyst and author Thomas Joscelyn, who has studied the Cole bombing, notes, "There is still much we don't know about the circumstances surrounding the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, which was tasked with enforcing U.N. sanctions on Iraq. The U.S. investigation into the bombing was initially stymied by Saleh's regime, which at first claimed the bombing was simply an accident. To this day it is not clear how competent the completed investigation was."
A few things are clear about the attack. In 2000, the Yemeni interior minister issued an official letter instructing security personnel to give safe passage to Sheik Mohammed Omar al-Harazi, one of the masterminds of the Cole bombing who is also known as Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri, Neither he nor his bodyguards were to searched or intercepted. "All security forces are instructed to cooperate with him and facilitate his missions," the letter said. During the 2004 trial of five co-conspirators, one Yemeni political analyst noted the travel pass "confirms that there is a breach in the Yemeni security system."
"This system has been infiltrated for a long time by terrorist elements, because of old relations," he said.
Some of the Cole conspirators were also in possession of weapons permits.
A former C.I.A. agent, Robert Baer, was told by a Saudi military contact that a Saudi merchant family had funded the U.S.S. Cole bombing and that the Yemeni government was covering up information related to that bombing. A leading Yemeni editor said in 2001, "It was clear from the start that the accessories to the attack would be tried, convicted and executed, but that the people inside Yemen who financed it, and used their power to facilitate it, would never be brought to book."
The regime has had difficulty keeping the attackers in jail. In 2003, eight of the Cole conspirators escaped from jail and two later went on to complete suicide operations in Iraq. Among the 2003 escapees was Jamal al-Badawi, another mastermind of the bombing. Al-Badawi was recaptured and returned to prison only to escape again with 22 other inmates.
After the Cole attack, President Saleh denied publicly that he had been notified by the United States that the Cole was en route to Aden. According to former CENTCOM commander Gen. Anthony Zinni, in his 2000 Congressional Testimony, standard U.S. procedure was to notify Yemeni officials about two weeks prior to a ship's arrival at port. It was just about two weeks before the attack on the Cole that the Pentagon's secret intelligence unit, Able Danger, began to pick up "massive terrorist activity" in Aden.
At the time of the bombings, a Yemeni regime official advanced the theory that the United States had blown up the ship itself, as pretense for an invasion. This fear mongering has continued. "There was a plan to occupy Aden," President Saleh said in a 2005 speech. According to President Saleh, eight U.S. warships waited at the mouth of the port of Aden, ready to invade in the days after the bombing. Only through his ******ship abilities, he claimed, was the invasion averted.
In reality, there were no U.S. warships in the area and all documentation indicates the Cole was traveling alone. In the days after the bombing, the crew of the Cole struggled unassisted to keep the ship afloat while the wounded were tended on deck. It is inconceivable that any U.S. ship in the area would not have come to their immediate aid.
A reduction in financial aid was the only punitive action against Yemen briefly discussed in the 2000 Congressional hearings, as an inducement for fuller cooperation with the F.B.I.'s investigation. It was deflected by Gen. Zinni's objections. At the time, Congress barely contemplated the possibility of regime involvement, based in large part on Gen. Zinni's assurances of Saleh's sincerity. The Clinton *****istration never discussed retaliation against Yemen for the Cole bombing, according to the 9/11 report and other documentation. Clinton briefly discussed a military strike against Afghanistan, but the concept of confronting the Taliban was shelved as Clinton's term drew to a close.
An Insider's View
Mr. Ahmed al-Hasani, former commander of Yemen's Navy and long time regime insider says he is not surprised by the escape, "considering the relations between the authorities and al-Qaeda," which he describes as strong and influential. Currently seeking asylum in Britain, Mr. al-Hasani is a vocal opponent of the regime's policies toward the population of the former South Yemen, which some have termed occupation rather than unification.
Osama bin Laden visited Yemen in the late 1990's and held a six-hour meeting in the airport with Gen. Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, among others. This meeting must have required the explicit permission of Saleh himself, al-Hasani says. In the interceding decade, there has been no *****istrative purge or major rehabilitation of top level bin Laden loyalists in the regime. Currently Al Qaeda sympathizers are spread throughout the upper levels of the military and security forces, al-Hasani asserts, including the Republican Guard and the Political Security Organization.
These Al Qaeda loyalists are motivated by ideology, and are well organized and well indoctrinated, he says, with several officers of the Republican Guards responsible for coordinating and aiding the activities of jihadist groups in Yemen including transportation, security, documentation and financing. These regime officials engage in money laundering and remuneration, through large Yemeni companies and through real estate, business and stock transactions in the Gulf States and South Asia including South Korea, Singapore and Thailand.
Those jihadists still in prison are kept to be released on demand, al-Hasani notes, "When they need them to do anything against their political enemies, they will be released for this purpose. This also means they can be used by the authorities against U.S. interests and targets." The escape of the 23 prisoners, he concludes, could not have happened without President Saleh's "will and wish."
Conclusion
The escape in Yemen may point to the need for a highly secure and humane international prison to augment the international criminal court and to house the world's most dangerous and escape prone inmates. Meanwhile, as a multi-nation flotilla patrols Yemen's coast, it seems unlikely the 23 escapees are in U.S. custody. It can be safely said that the United States' policy of elite rehabilitation, which worked well in Pakistan after 9/11, has succeeded less well in Yemen, as months and years of counter terrorism work is undone by repeated jailbreaks. Unless Judge al-Hittar begins a dialog program with some of the upper level military and security forces to dissuade them of their extremist ideology, the best hope for Yemen lies with democratization, a process actively repelled by President Saleh and the well-entrenched elite, but actively sought by a number of activists and a good portion of the Yemeni population.
Jane Novak is an American journalist and political analyst]

[أنا هو]

استقرار حالته الصحية بعد أن تلقى العلاج في مستشفى مدينة تينز
الشيخ المؤيد يخشى من إجباره على الأعمال الشاقة بعد عودته إلى السجن

الشورى نت -
شكا الشيخ محمد المؤيد – والذي يتلقى العلاج حاليا في مستشفى مدينة تينز بولاية نورت كارولينا – من تدهور حالته الصحية قبل نقله إلى المستشفى واجباره على ممارسة الأشغال الشاقة كجزء من العقوبة المحكوم بها عليه.

وقال موقع «نيوز يمن» أن الشيخ محمد المؤيد اتصل بأسرته أمس الأربعاء من المستشفى الذي يتلقى العلاج فيه مطمئنا أن حالته الصحية مستقرة حاليا لكنه يخشى من تدهور صحته حال عودته إلى السجن من جديد.

وكان الشيخ المؤيد نقل من سجن ولاية كلورادو في الثاني عشر من أكتوبر الماضي إلى المستشفى بسبب تدهور حالته الصحية.

المحامي خالد الآنسي قال لـ«نيوز يمن» ان موعد خروج الشيخ المؤيد من المستشفى لم يتقرر لكنه أشار إلى أن المحامين الأمريكيين المكلفين بالترافع عنه أمام الاستئناف سيقدمون خلال شهر استئنافهم وستسلم للادعاء للرد عليها وسيحدد عقب ذلك موعد للمحاكمة.

وأضاف الآنسي أن مرافق الشيخ المؤيد (محمد زايد) لم يتصل بأسرته منذ نقله إلى سجن ولاية كلورادو قبل شهرين ما أضطر وزير الخارجية أبوبكر القربي إلى التوجيه إلى السفارة اليمنية بواشنطن بزيارته والاطمئنان على صحته.

يذكر أن المحكمة الأمريكية حكمت على الشيخ محمد المؤيد بالسجن (75) عاما وعلى مرافقه محمد زايد بالسجن أيضا (45) عاما بعد ان اعتقلا في أحد فنادق المانيا بحيلة دبرها العميل للمخابرات الأمريكية محمد العنسي قبل أكثر من عامين, لكنه لم يتحصل على ما كانت وعدته المخابرات من اعطائه الجنسية الأمريكية وملايين الدولارات ما أضطره إلى إحراق نفسه أمام البيت الأبيض منذ ما يقرب من عام.

[راجع ياوطني]

ماذكر بعالية هو جزء من لعبة النظام وهو جزء صغير وهناك اجزاء اخرى تمتد من المؤسسة العسكرية الاقتصاطية ولاتنتهي بمؤسسة السياحة في صنعاء وتمر من بوابة عمارة الشيطان وتمتد الى اريحا والمانيا 00 هل في زعماء الجنوب اليمني او الجنوب العربي من يستطيع فك تلك الشفرة00 انا احس والمس ولااعرف 00 ترى اي نظام واي رجال هؤلاء 0

[راجع ياوطني]

معلومات قيمة 00 المهم كيف نفك طلاسمها يا ابناء الجنوب العربي 0

[أنا هو]

التحقيق مع جهاديين في اليمن بحضور أمريكي
قائد أمريكي يعتبر علاقات بلاده مع اليمن حميمية بدون قوات عسكرية!

02/04/2006 صنعاء – نيوزيمن:
قال نائب قائد القوات المركزية الأميركية لشؤون الإستراتيجية والتخطيط الجنرال (مارك كميت) أن بلاده ترتبط بعلاقات قوية مع كل دول الخليج بما في ذلك اليمن، مضيفاً "ولدينا اتفاقيات مع كل هذه الدول, وهناك بعض الاتفاقيات السرية، وبعض الأمور التي تظل طي الكتمان، وهناك دائما اتفاقيات تظل سرية ومخفية".
وأشار في حوار مع مراسل وكالة الأنباء اليمنية سبأ في الإمارات إلى أن علاقة بلاده مع اليمن قوية وحميمية, مضيفاً "وأوكد لك وبفخر ان علاقتنا باليمن تحتل مكانه عالية ومميزة".
ونفى وجود أي قواعد عسكرية أميركية في اليمن, مشيراً إلى أن لديهم فقط "ضباط في سفارتنا بصنعاء كما في باقي دول المنطقة، ومهمتهم الأساسية إدارة المواضيع الأمنية ضمن الاتفاقات الدولية والاتفاقيات الموقعة مع اليمن وخصوصا في مجال مكافحة الإرهاب" علاقات بلاده بالإمارات قوية ومتميزة وحميمية، مؤكداً أنه "لا يمكن ان يؤثر عليها ماحدث في صفقة (موانئ دبي العالمية)، وأؤكد لك ان موضوع موانئ دبي العالمية لن تؤثر عليها إطلاقا".
ورفض الجنرال كميت الحديث عن نجاح اوفشل بلاده في العراق, مضيفاً "إنما يمكن الحديث عن عمل لم يكتمل في العراق, نحن نحقق تقدما، وجميعنا يسعى الى تحقيق تقدم وان ننهي العمل في العراق بأسرع وقت وبأقل خسائر، وبأقل ضحايا، وبنوع اقل من اللااستقرار, والخطأ سيكون ان تتخلى عن عمل بدأته وتعيشه دون ان تتمه .سوف لن نبتعد وسوف لن ننسحب ولن نفشل في العراق".
وتابع "ما قالته رايس هو انسحاب لبعض القوات والوحدات وليس انسحابا كاملا لكل الوحدات ومن كل القطاعات، وهذا الانسحاب سيعتمد على مقدار النجاح الذي يتحقق على الأرض، بمعنى انه بقدر التقدم الذي تحققه القوات العراقية بأن يكون لديها القدرة على تحمل المسئولية، وعندما يتقدم العراقيين في اخذ مسئولياتهم، فسيكون عدد قواتنا اقل".
وكان خالد عبد النبي زعيم مايوصف بجماعة حطاط الجهادية قال أمس الأول لصحيفة الشرق الأوسط أن محقيين أمركيين شاركوا الأمن اليمني التحقيق مع أفراد من جماعات "جهادية" حول تحضيرهم للسفر إلى العراق لـ«الجهاد» ضد القوات الأجنبية

[أنا هو]

السفارة الأمريكية تكثف عملياتها الإستخباراتية في اليمن!
أخبار الوطن: تحركات مريبة من أجل الحصول على معلومات جديدة حول الجماعات والتيارات الإسلامية !

الإثنين 03 إبريل-نيسان 2006 / مأرب برس / متابعات
كشفت أوساط سياسية عن تحريكات استخباراتية كثيفة تقوم بها السفارة الأميركية عبر عديد من مسؤوليها وموظفيها في اليمن عقب وصول شخص أميركي ينشط في العمل ألاستخباراتي حيث تسعى أميركا من خلال هذا الشخص الذي يعمل لصالح وكالة المخابرات الأميركية CIA وعدد من العناصر الاستخباراتية التابعة للسفارة الأميركية بصنعاء إلى الحصول على معلومات جديدة حول الجماعات والتيارات الإسلامية في اليمن بعد أن حصلت الإدارة الأميركية على معلومات استخباراتية تفيد بان هناك عدداً من العناصر الفارة لجأت عقب فرارها إلى عناصر تتفق مع الفارين أيدلوجياً وفكرياً . وربط تلك الأوساط بين تكثيف السفارة الأميركية لأنشطتها الاستخباراتية وبين بعض الأعمال الصحفية التي تسير وفق أجندة استخباراتية أميركية بحته حيث كان آخر تلك الأعمال المقابلة الصحفية التي أجرتها صحيفة الشرق الأوسط عبر مراسل راديو سوا الأميركي مع خالد عبد النبي زعيم ما كان يسمى بـ جيش عدن ـ أبين الإسلامي مؤكدة بأن مشروع بعض وسائل الإعلام المحلية والعربية والأجنبية فتح ملفات الجماعات والتيارات الإسلامية عبر مقابلات وحوارات وتناولات صحيفة آخري يشير إلى أن العناصر الذين تستخدمهم الإدارة الأميركية للقيام بهذه المهمة لا تقتصر على من يتبعون أو يمثلون أجهزة مخابراتها وإنما تكلف شخصيات دبلوماسية وسياسية وإعلامية أيضاً في الأماكن التي تشعر الإدارة الأميركية وسفارتها بأن العناصر الأستخباراتية والأمن تستطيع الوصول إلى أية نتيجة أو الحصول على معلومات جديدة وقد تفشل في هذه المهمة . ونقلت تلك المصادر التي نشرتها صحيفة أخبار اليوم أن الزيارة الأخيرة التي قام بها السيد نبيل خوري ـ نائب السفير الأميركي بصنعاء إلى محافظة حضرموت تندرج أيضاً ضمن هذه المهمة ومهام آخري تحاول السفارة الأميركية استخدام أراضي حضرموت لتنفيذ عديد مهام تآمرية تنسيقية .

[أنا هو]

جماعات متشددة تعتدي على المواطنين في أبين بحجة إقامة الشرع !

الشورى نت-خاص ( 04/03/2006 )
عادت مجموعة منتمية إلى الجماعات السلفية المتشددة في مدينة لودر بمحافظة أبين أفرجت عنهم السلطات الأمنية مؤخرا واتهموا بصلاتهم بتنظيم القاعدة وجيش عدن أبين الإسلامي، عادت هذه المجاميع إلى النشاط بصورة علنية، عن طريق الاعتداء على عدد من المواطنين تحت سمع وبصر الأجهزة الأمنية التي عجزت عن وقف ممارساتهم..

وخلال الثلاثة الأيام الماضية قامت عناصر الجماعة بثلاثة اعتداءات تجاه مواطنين تعرضوا للضرب على أيدي الجماعات التي أوكلت لنفسها حق ضبط المظاهر المسيئة للدين حد تعبير أفراد هذه الجماعات.

ويقول أفراد هذه الجماعات إنهم يقومون بمحاربة الرذيلة وإقامة الحدود وضبط الأخلاق العامة، وفي مقدمتها شرب الخمر التي يعزون عددا من حوادث الاعتداء إليها.